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Queensland Government Actions to Compensate Survivors of 
Institutional Abuse: a critical and comparative evaluation 
 
Dr Ben Mathews* 
 
Governments in a number of jurisdictions have responded to 
revelations of sustained abuse and neglect of children in State 
institutions by establishing schemes awarding financial 
compensation to survivors, and amending limitation statutes to 
enable the commencement of civil proceedings.  In 1999, the Forde 
Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland 
Institutions reported a similarly devastating incidence of abuse and 
neglect, and its recommendations included the establishment by the 
Queensland government of a monetary compensation scheme.  This 
article contrasts the Queensland government’s calculated failure to 
respond to this recommendation, and its antithetical personal 
injuries legislation, with the actions of its counterparts. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
History reveals a pattern of physical, sexual and emotional maltreatment of children 
in Anglo-Saxon societies.  Children’s traditional status as mere units of economic 
labour and chattels for sale, without legal recognition or rights, meant that adults 
were able to subject children to multiple forms of abuse and neglect with impunity.1  
                                                 
* LLB (JCU), BA (Hons), PhD (QUT), Lecturer in the School of Law, Queensland University of 
Technology. 
1 See generally L de Mause (ed), The History Of Childhood, Bellew, London, 1974 and L de Mause, 
‘The Evolution Of Childhood’, in The History Of Childhood, 1. During the Dark and Middle Ages, 
childhood was a period of life characterised by brutality and exploitation.  There were no laws 
protecting children.  Children’s lack of legal rights was embodied in the concept of patria potestas, 
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Most commonly, this abuse and neglect has been perpetrated by individuals within 
families, but it has also been perpetrated on children entrusted to the care of 
government and religious institutions.  
 
It is only in the last few decades that this incidence of abuse and neglect of children 
in State and religious institutions has begun to be revealed.  In a number of 
jurisdictions, bodies of inquiry have discovered appalling records of institutional 
abuse and neglect of children.2  In Queensland, the Forde Commission of Inquiry into 
Abuse of Children in Institutions was commendably established by the Queensland 
government on 13 August 1998 after growing evidence of abuse of children in State 
and religious institutions.3 The Forde Inquiry found endemic emotional, physical, 
sexual and systems abuse, as well as breaches of statutory obligations to provide 
food, clothing, education and appropriate discipline.4  Tragically, after the Forde 
                                                                                                                                            
which gave a father dominion over his children (and his wife).  The extent of this power was such that 
in early Roman law the father had the right to abandon infants to the elements: A Borkowski, Textbook 
on Roman Law, Blackstone Press, London, 1994, 103; J Gardner, Women in Roman Law and Society, 
Routledge, London, 1986, 155.  A father had the right to punish his children, which could include 
imposing a penalty of death: Gardner, 6-7; and the right to sell his children; from at least the seventh 
century a father could legally sell his children aged under seven: P Thane,  ‘Childhood in History’, in 
M King (ed), Childhood, Welfare & Justice, Batsford, London, 1981, 12. 
2 In Canada, for example, New Brunswick established its compensation scheme in 1995 after it 
commissioned the Miller Inquiry in 1992, the government of British Columbia established its 
compensation scheme in 1995 after it commissioned the Berger Report in 1993, and Nova Scotia 
established its compensation program in 1996 after its Stratton Inquiry found that the State had a moral 
obligation to respond to the claims of victims: G Shea, Redress Programs Relating to Institutional 
Child Abuse in Canada (1999) Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada 
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/mr/ica/shea/redress/redress_main.asp> at 31 January 2004.  In Ireland 
in 1970, the Kennedy Report first investigated State-run and State-certified reformatories and industrial 
schools and uncovered the problems of neglect, deprivation and emotional abuse.  In 1999, Prime 
Minister Bertie Ahern introduced several strategies to address more recent revelations of child abuse in 
State institutions, including the establishment of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, chaired 
by Justice Laffoy, which is due to report in 2005: Ireland, Compensation Advisory Committee, 
Towards Redress And Recovery: Report To The Minister For Education And Science, 2002, 
<http://www.rirb.ie/documents/cac_report2002.pdf> at 31 January 2004 (hereafter referred to as 
Towards Redress And Recovery).   
3 Queensland Government, Response to Recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of 
Children in Queensland Institutions, 1999, 1-2, 
<http://www.families.qld.gov.au/department/forde/publications/documents/pdf/forde_govtresp.pdf> at 
31 January 2004 (hereafter referred to as 1999 Response To Recommendations). 
4 Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions, 1999, Brisbane, iv-vi, 277-
280, 
<http://www.families.qld.gov.au/department/forde/publications/documents/pdf/forde_comminquiry.pdf
> at 31 January 2004 (hereafter referred to as the Forde Inquiry). 
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Inquiry, another inquiry into the abuse of children in State foster care has been 
necessary in Queensland, with similarly damning results.5 
 
These inquiries exemplify the fact that the historical record of child abuse and neglect 
has only recently been given anything approaching the attention it needs.  It is 
undeniable that in the general context of child abuse and neglect, advances in 
knowledge and social policy have been made.  As a social phenomenon, ‘child abuse 
and neglect’6 has been identified.7  The psychological, educational and social effects 
of abuse and neglect have been researched and documented.8  Government 
                                                 
5 Crime And Misconduct Commission, Protecting Children: An Inquiry Into Abuse Of Children In 
Foster Care, 2004, Crime and Misconduct Commission, Brisbane, < 
http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/library/CMCWEBSITE/ProtectingChildren.pdf> at 31 January 2004.   
6 There are four categories of abuse and neglect: physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and 
neglect: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child protection Australia 2002-03, Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2004, 15 (hereafter referred to as AIHW).   
7 See especially the most influential and most cited scholarly article in the field, C Kempe, F 
Silverman, B Steele, W Droegemuller and A Silver, ‘The battered child syndrome’, (1962) 187 Journal 
of the American Medical Association, 17; and D Kline, ‘Educational and psychological problems of 
abused children’, (1977) 1 (2) Child Abuse and Neglect, 301, contained in the first publication of the 
scholarly journal Child Abuse and Neglect.  The emergence of a body of evidence concerning the 
psychological sequelae of child sexual abuse, and the heightened general awareness of child sexual 
abuse, are therefore relatively recent developments: confirming this in a legal context in Australia, see 
the psychiatric testimony of Dr Kippax in Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Queensland, Byrne J, 22 April 1993).  Cases of child sexual abuse were known of by authorities, 
however, at least as long ago as the early 1900s.  According to Dorothy Scott and Shurlee Swain’s 
Confronting Cruelty: historical perspectives on child abuse, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 
2002, 52, between 1891 and 1907 there were 177 reported cases of child sexual abuse in Queensland; 
the Argus newspaper stated ‘We cannot believe such a state of things exists in this community’: cited in 
R Yallop, ‘Too hard to cope with’ The Australian, 27 May 2003, 9.  Early children’s rights activists 
knew of these phenomena also, and their activities in the late 1800s and early 1900s motivated the 
formation of children’s rights and advocacy bodies such as the National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children in the United Kingdom.  
8 See for example the evidence regarding abuse and neglect acknowledged by the Forde Inquiry, above 
n 4, xi-xii, 284-287; see also D Wolfe, Child Abuse: Implications for Child Development and 
Psychopathology, 2nd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1999; B Egeland, D Jacobovitz and A Sroufe, 
‘Breaking the cycle of abuse’ (1988) 59 Child Development 1080; R Famulro, T Fenton and R 
Kinscherff, ‘Psychiatric diagnoses of maltreated children: preliminary findings’ (1992) 31 Journal of 
the American Academy of Child Psychiatry 863; M Dunne and M Legosz, ‘The consequences of 
childhood sexual abuse’ in Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project 
AXIS – Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: Selected Research and Papers, 2000, Brisbane, 43, 43-50; 
S McLeer, E Deblinger, M Atkins, E Foa and D Ralphe, ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder in sexually 
abused children’ (1988) 27 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; 
S McLeer, E Deblinger, D Henry and H Orvaschel, ‘Sexually abused children at high risk for post-
traumatic stress disorder’ (1992) 31 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry 875; P Mullen, ‘Childhood Sexual Abuse and Mental Health in Adult Life’ (1993) 163 
British Journal of Psychiatry 721; P Ackerman, J Newton, W McPherson, J Jones and R Dykman, 
‘Prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychiatric diagnoses in three groups of abused 
children (sexual, physical, and both)’ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 759; S McLeer, J Dixon, D 
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departments are empowered to receive and investigate complaints, and to take 
protective action in certain cases.9  The incidence of child abuse and neglect is 
monitored.10  The inquiries into institutional abuse should also constitute an advance 
in this context, since their findings should inform future government policy and 
practice to ensure that the perpetration of cruelty and violence within State care does 
not happen again.   
 
Because of these advances, it is fair to judge that the worst excesses of this tradition 
have passed, at least in modern liberal states.  The evolution of liberal society, the 
academic recognition of childhood as a stage of life that is qualitatively different from 
adulthood, legislative recognition of children’s needs and rights, and the creation of 
government departments responsible for child protection, all have positive 
consequences for the quality of children’s lives.  In Australian States and Territories, 
adults can no longer kill, abandon and sell children without dire consequences, and 
criminal laws are at least capable of punishing those who inflict physical and sexual 
abuse on children.11 
 
This judgment is qualified and should not be accompanied by satisfaction.  There is 
substantial evidence that despite these piecemeal advances, there remain 
                                                                                                                                            
Henry et al, ‘Psychopathology in non-clinically referred sexually abused children’ (1998) 37 Journal of 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1326; . 
9 For example, the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld). 
10 For example, by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 
11 The qualification is necessary since incidents of physical and sexual abuse of children are by their 
nature seldom reported, and therefore seldom prosecuted.  The Criminal Code Chapter 22 deals with 
offences against morality, including sexual offences involving children (including, for example, ss208 
(unlawful sodomy), 210 (indecent treatment of children under 16), 215 (carnal knowledge with or of 
children under 16), 222 (incest) and 229B (maintaining a sexual relationship with a child).  Chapter 30 
contains offences based on assaults; and Chapter 32 deals with sexual offences generally.  See also the 
Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 (Qld) which provides for compensation for victims of indictable 
offences.  The scheme applies to acts committed after 18 December 1995.  Section 46 preserves the 
previous compensation scheme, which applies to acts committed between 1 January 1969 and 18 
December 1995.  The Criminal Code Amendment Act 1968 (Qld) established in Chapter 65A of the 
Criminal Code a compensation scheme for injury arising out of indictable offences relating to the 
person, but s 3 stated that the Act did not apply in respect of compensation for injury suffered before 
commencement of the Act.  The Act commenced on 1 January 1969. 
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fundamental defects in individuals’ treatment of children, and in public authorities’  
protection of children in their care.12  Recent evidence indicates that the occurrence 
of child abuse and neglect is still appalling.  From 1994-98 in Queensland, 15 774 
child sex offences were reported to police.13  In Queensland in 2002-03 there were 
31 068 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 22 027 
children.14  Of these, there were 12 203 substantiated cases involving 9032 
children.15  In 2002-03 in Queensland, 4107 children were living under care and 
protection orders issued by the State.16  Perhaps most disturbing of all, some of 
these children in State care, even after the revelations of the Forde Inquiry, have 
been found to have suffered abuse and neglect while in State care.17  In a 
preventative sense, then, evidence suggests that what progress may have been 
made is not nearly enough, both in individual and State-governed contexts. 
 
Moreover, there is a second sense in which it is clear that the responses of the State 
have been deficient.  This second responsive sense concerns the issue of how the 
State responds to people who have been abused and neglected in its institutions, 
and this context is the focus of this article.  The responsive context has two main 
concerns: first, the compensation of survivors of State institutional abuse; and 
second, the question of amendment of statutory limitation periods to enable civil 
suits. 
                                                 
12 Although any balanced comment in this context must recognise that it is not possible to eradicate 
cases of child abuse and neglect, there are limits to what is acceptable.   
13 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS – Child Sexual Abuse 
in Queensland: The Nature and Extent, 2000, Brisbane, 28 (Table 3).  The incidence of child sexual 
abuse is notoriously difficult to assess due to the low rate of reports.  The reported number of offences 
represents only a proportion of the actual number of incidents. 
14 AIHW, above n 6, 17 (Table 2.6). 
15 Ibid 17 (Table 2.6).  The 12 203 substantiations in Queensland comprised 2806 of physical abuse; 
610 of sexual abuse; 4135 of emotional abuse; and 4652 of neglect: AIHW 16 (Table 2.5). 
16 Ibid 31 (Table 3.5).  These orders comprise guardianship or custody orders (3831), supervisory 
orders (135) and interim and temporary orders (141): 31 (Table 3.6).  In Australia, in 2002-2003, there 
were 198 355 child protection notifications: 14 (Table 2.3), and there were 40 416 substantiated cases 
of child abuse and neglect: 15 (Table 2.4).  As at 30 June 2003, there were 22 130 children on care and 
protection orders: 31 (Table 3.5). 
17 Crime and Misconduct Commission, above n 5. 
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In contrast to several comparable overseas jurisdictions and one other jurisdiction in 
Australia, survivors of institutional abuse in Queensland have not been financially 
compensated for their suffering at the hands of the State.  As well, in contrast to 
jurisdictions where the unfair operation of limitation statutes on plaintiffs in this class 
has been recognised, and amendments have enabled individual survivors to institute 
legal proceedings, the Queensland government has instead relied on statutory 
obstacles to deny survivors of institutional abuse access to the courts.  In addition, 
the Queensland government amended new personal injuries legislation in 2002, 
making pre-court procedural requirements retrospective, which further complicates 
legal redress for survivors of historical abuse..   
 
The actions taken by comparable governments forms the closest measure by which 
the financial and legal responses of the Queensland government can be evaluated.  
Like Queensland, these governments initiated inquiries that revealed direct and 
substantial evidence of the extent of child abuse in State institutions.  In the unusual 
case of Tasmania, the fact of the abuse has been accepted without establishing an 
inquiry, but its response in establishing a compensation scheme qualifies it too as a 
comparable jurisdiction.  Queensland is the only Australian jurisdiction to have 
recently conducted a detailed inquiry into institutional child abuse and neglect, 
although South Australia may soon do so after the introduction on 1 July 2004 of the 
Commission of Inquiry (Children in State Care) Bill.  As well, the Commonwealth 
Senate Community Affairs References Committee recently completed its Australia-
wide Inquiry Into Children In Institutional Care, but is yet to report.  The findings of 
this Senate report, and any made by an inquiry eventuating in South Australia, may 
warrant assessments of responses in coming years by other Australian jurisdictions.  
The focus of this article is therefore on Queensland, primarily due to the 
overwhelming evidence from two inquiries about the extent of child abuse in State 
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care, the express recommendation of the Forde Inquiry that survivors of institutional 
abuse should be financially compensated, and because of Queensland’s strikingly 
different responses to these inquiries when compared to other jurisdictions.18  In Part 
2 of this article, the responses of other jurisdictions in this context are summarised, 
detailing financial redress schemes and the amendment of statutes of limitation.  Part 
3 describes the Queensland government’s response to the recommendations of the 
Forde Inquiry regarding compensation, which was to do nothing except direct 
survivors to take action in the courts.  Part 4 discusses the implications of that 
direction by summarising the personal injuries litigation framework in Queensland at 
two points: pre-2002, governed by the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, and post-2002, 
                                                 
18 In other Australian jurisdictions not having a compensation scheme, any adult survivors of long past 
institutional abuse (or non-institutional abuse) will face identical or similar problems posed by statutes 
of limitation that confront plaintiffs in this class in Queensland.  In New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, plaintiffs who have 
suffered personal injury have three years from the date of that injury to institute proceedings: 
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 18A(2) and 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 5(1AA) and 
27D(1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(1); Limitation Act 
1981 (NT) s 12(1)(b); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B.  In Western Australia, a plaintiff has four or 
six years if the cause of action is in assault and battery, or negligence respectively: Limitation Act 1935 
(WA) ss 38(1)(b) and 38(1)(c)(vi).  Even where there is a State-sponsored scheme, as in Tasmania, this 
will not assist survivors of abuse by private individuals.  Minority does constitute a legal disability in 
most jurisdictions, but this only suspends the limitation period until majority, so most plaintiffs have 
until they turn 21 to institute proceedings, which is not possible for many plaintiffs in this class due to 
the nature of the events and injuries: Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 5(2), 11, 29(2)(c); 
Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 2(2), 26; Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 40; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) ss 
4(1), 36; Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) ss 8(3), 30.  Recent legislative changes in New South Wales and 
Victoria alter this position to require a minor who is injured to bring proceedings within three years of 
injury through a capable parent or guardian, rather than suspending the running of time: Limitation Act 
1969 (NSW) ss 11(3), 50F(2)(a), 50C(1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 27J(1)(a), 
27D(1)(a) – contrast the situation where the wrongdoer is the victim’s parent or a close associate of the 
parent: s 50E(1)(a) and s 27I(1)(a) respectively.  In South Australia, a less stringent amendment has 
been enacted, but this still can require a child who suffers personal injury to give notice of the intended 
action to certain defendants within six years of the date the injury was sustained: Limitation of Actions 
Act 1936 (SA) s 45A.  In most but not all jurisdictions, extension provisions are available, but even 
where this is so, applications by plaintiffs in this class will face strong difficulties: see for example in 
Queensland the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 30, 31, and the unsuccessful applications for an 
extension of time by institutional survivors such as those referred to later in this article.  For a fuller 
discussion of the difficulties posed by traditional time limitation periods in this context, see B 
Mathews, ‘Limitation periods and child sexual abuse cases: Law, psychology, time and justice’ (2003) 
11 (3) TLJ 218, and other references below, n 58.  Extension provisions in other jurisdictions that are 
relevant here include Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 57-60 (if injured before 1 September 1990); ss 
60A-60E (if injured between 1 Sep 1990-5 December 2002); ss 62A and 62B (if injured on or after 6 
December 2002); ss 60F-60J for all causes of action, if there is latent injury; Limitation of Actions Act 
1958 (Vic) ss 23A, 27K, 27L; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 
5(3) (but limited to maximum six years from date of cause of action); Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44; 
and Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36(1)-(3).  In Western Australia there are no comparable extension 
provisions.. 
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governed by both the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 and the Limitation of 
Actions Act.  This comparative exploration will then inform conclusions about the 
Queensland government’s responses, and recommendations for practical and legal 
reform. 
 
 
2 Redress schemes and amendments to statutes of limitation 
2.1 Redress schemes 
Either independently, or motivated by the recommendations of these bodies of 
inquiry, a number of governments have taken strong practical and moral action to 
remedy the damage inflicted on survivors of these institutions by designing redress 
schemes.  Avenues of redress commonly included in these schemes include 
apologies, acknowledgment of the harm done, counselling, education programs, 
access to records, and assistance reunifying families.19  A central feature of the 
redress schemes is the design and implementation of financial compensation 
schemes, to which responsible religious institutions contribute.  Both inquiries and 
government initiatives independent of inquiries have accepted that the provision of 
financial compensation for pain and suffering to those who have suffered damage at 
the hands of the State is a moral imperative.20  
 
The Law Commission of Canada, which undertook a comprehensive review of State 
responses to institutional abuse, declared that five principles must be respected in all 
processes through which survivors of institutional abuse seek redress.  First, 
survivors should possess all information necessary to make informed choices about 
                                                 
19 The Law Commission of Canada recognised that typically, survivors seek acknowledgment of the 
harm done; accountability for that harm; an apology; access to therapy and education; financial 
compensation; memorials; a commitment to raising public awareness of institutional child abuse; and a 
commitment to preventing its recurrence: Law Commission of Canada, Restoring Dignity: Responding 
to Child Abuse in Canadian Institutions, 2000, Executive Summary, 
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/mr/ica/2000/pdf/execsum.pdf> at 31 January 2004, 3. 
20 See generally Law Commission of Canada, ibid. 
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what course of redress to undertake.  Second, they should have access to 
counselling and support.  Third, those conducting or managing the process (judges, 
lawyers, police) should have the training necessary to enable them to understand the 
circumstances of survivors.  Fourth, continual efforts should be made to improve 
redress programs.  Fifth, the process should not cause further harm to survivors.21 
 
2.1.1 Canada 
In Canada, provincial governments have established compensation schemes in 
situations where children were abused and neglected in State-funded and State-
operated institutions.22  These include the British Columbia Jericho Individual 
Compensation Program 1995; the New Brunswick Compensation Program; the Nova 
Scotia Compensation Program 1996; the Ontario Grandview Agreement 
Compensation Scheme 1994; and the Ontario St John’s and St Joseph’s Helpline 
Agreement 1993. 
 
The Law Commission of Canada recommended as the most effective official 
response in meeting the needs of survivors the use of redress programs that are 
designed with survivors, which involve responses to all their needs.  Such programs 
are more flexible, less costly, less time-consuming, less psychologically traumatic 
and less confrontational than conventional legal proceedings.23  It also recommended 
that ex gratia payments should be offered in cases where an otherwise meritorious 
and provable claim cannot be pursued because it falls outside a limitation period.24  
 
2.1.2 Ireland 
                                                 
21 Ibid 9-10. 
22 G Shea, Redress Programs, above n 2; see too R Bessner, Institutional Child Abuse in Canada, 
(1998) Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada 
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/mr/ica/besrep/besrep_main.asp> at 31 January 2004. 
23 Law Commission of Canada, above n 19, 8-9. 
24 Ibid 23. 
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In Ireland, revelations of abuse in State orphanages, industrial schools and other 
institutions influenced Prime Minister Bertie Ahern to make a statement on 11 May 
1999 acknowledging and apologising for the abuse suffered by children in 
institutional care.  Mr Ahern acknowledged that the effects of abuse ‘ruined their 
childhoods and has been an ever-present part of their adult lives’, and admitted that 
they were ‘grossly wronged, and that we must do all we can now to overcome the 
lasting effects of their ordeals’.25  Several strategies were implemented to address 
the situation including the establishment of the Commission to Inquire into Child 
Abuse.26  On 3 October 2000 the Minister for Education and Science announced that 
the government had agreed in principle to a compensatory scheme, and in February 
2001 he revealed that the government had agreed to his plan for the scheme.27  The 
Residential Institutions Redress Bill was presented on 11 June 2001, establishing the 
Compensation Advisory Committee.  The CAC responded to the Minister for 
Education and Science in January 2002 in its report entitled Towards Redress And 
Recovery, making recommendations about the form and content of the 
compensatory scheme.28  The Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002 was passed 
on 10 April 2002, establishing the Residential Institutions Redress Board and 
associated bodies (eg the RIR Review Committee) and its functions and powers.29  
The Residential Institutions Redress Board scheme, funded by government with 
                                                 
25 Towards Redress And Recovery, above n 2, 14. 
26 The function of the Laffoy Commission was to inquire into the nature and extent of abuse of children 
in residential institutions, to find out where and why abuse had occurred, and to determine who was 
responsible for it.  The Laffoy Commission will report in 2005, and will make recommendations on 
what should be done to deal with the continuing effects of abuse and on strategies to prevent further 
abuse of children in these institutions: ibid 1-3, 15. 
27 In July 2000 a group of lawyers asked the Laffoy Commission to publish an interim report 
recommending the implementation of an independent compensation scheme for survivors.  These 
lawyers had noted the difficulty for them, without such a scheme, about whether to advise their clients 
to participate in the Laffoy inquiry.  The Laffoy Commission referred this request to the government, 
acknowledging that in the absence of such a scheme, a significant barrier to its investigation existed: 
Towards Redress And Recovery, above n 2, 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Complemented by the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002 (Section 33) Regulations 2002, the 
Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002 (Section 17) Regulations 2002 and the Residential 
Institutions Redress Act 2002 (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2002. 
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contributions from responsible religious authorities,30 was launched on 2 December 
2002.  The average award to date is 80 000 euros (approximately $A137 000).31 
 
2.1.3 Tasmania 
Albeit on a vastly reduced monetary scale, the Tasmanian government has 
established a similar scheme32 pursuant to a Protocol Agreement made between the 
                                                 
30 Under the Residential Institutions Redress Act the government funds the compensation fund, with 
any contributions made by religious institutions.  The Irish bishops’ conference agreed to pay 
$A217.62 million into the compensation fund and in return received indemnity for future claims about 
past child abuse claims: ‘Irish abuse claims could reach $A1.71 billion’, Catholic News, 31 October 
2003.  This contribution by the Church has been criticised as being too small, since the total amount 
disbursed under the scheme will probably be at least 1 billion euros, and possibly as high as 2 billion 
euros: B O’Kelly, ‘Letter shows state caved in on deal’, Sunday Business Post, 5 October 2003.  If 
there are 10 800 claims (as estimated in a report by the government’s Auditor-General), each averaging 
80 000 euro awards, the amount of compensation awarded will be 864 million euros (approximately 
$A1.4 billion). 
31 See generally the website of the RIRB at <http://www.rirb.ie/>.   Applications must be made within 
three years of 2 December 2002.  By 22 December 2003, the Board had received 2553 applications and 
had completed 587 applications.  Of these 587, 431 offers of compensation had been made following 
settlement talks with the Board, and 104 awards of compensation had been made after Board hearings.  
Fifty-two applications had been refused by the Board because the applicant did not reside in one of the 
named institutions.  The largest award by 22 December 2003 had been one of 270000 euros 
(approximately $A463 000): Residential Institutions Redress Board, Newsletter, 22 December 2003, 
<http://www.rirb.ie/updates_article.asp?NID=56> at 31 January 2004.  By 11 May 2004, 1070 cases 
had been finalised: Residential Institutions Redress Board, Statement, 11 May 2004, 
<http://www.rirb.ie/updates_article.asp?NID=58> at 9 July 2004. 
There are four heads of compensation: severity of abuse and injury, additional redress, medical 
expenses, and other costs and expenses.  There are guidelines for assessing the severity of abuse and 
there is a schedule of ratings (weightings) which equate to 5 redress ‘bands’, demarcating the amount 
of redress payable.  Band 5 represents cases of the most severe abuse and this band comprises amounts 
payable of 200 000 – 300 000 Euros (approximately $A343 000 – 515 000).  Band 4 enables payments 
of 150000 – 200000 euros (approximately $A257 000 – 343 000).  Band 3: 100000 – 150000 
(approximately $170 000 – 255 000).  Band 2: 50 000 – 100 000 euros (approximately $A85 000 – 170 
000).  Band 1: up to 50 000 euros (approximately $A85 000).  Eligible applicants must have suffered 
sexual, physical or emotional abuse while residing at an industrial school, reformatory, children’s 
home, special hospital or similar institution and have suffered physical, psychiatric or other injury 
consistent with that abuse.  The person must have been residing in one of the named institutions (there 
are some 128 of these), and must not have received compensation from a court or settlement.  The 
alleged perpetrator does not have to have been criminally convicted.  There is an application form that 
must be completed and submitted to the Board.  The Board will obtain evidence from any person and 
institution named in an application.  If the Board judges that an applicant is entitled to redress, it may 
make an offer of settlement which the applicant can accept or reject.  If accepted, no further action is 
necessary; but the applicant cannot seek other compensation through the courts.  If rejected, the 
application will then be heard by the Board at a hearing.  Hearings are closed to the public, informal, 
conducted by a panel of 2-3 Board members, and enable the calling of witnesses.  Persons and 
institutions named in the application can participate in the hearing.  Awards made by the Board can be 
reviewed by a Review Committee, which can uphold, increase or decrease the Board’s award. 
32 See Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 August 2003, (Michael Aird, Leader 
of the Government in the Council) 
<http://www.hansard.parliament.tas.gov.au/ISYSquery/IRL1DCE.tmp/1/doc> at 31 January 2004; see 
also the report of Tasmania’s Ombudsman Jan O’Grady, Interim Report On Abuse Of Children In State 
Care, 2004, 
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Ombudsman and the Department of Health and Human Services.33  The review of 
claims system was established after revelations in July 2003 of sexual abuse of a 
former State ward in foster care.  While not establishing an inquiry into the abuse of 
children in State care,34 the Tasmanian government established this system to assist 
people who had made claims of past abuse.   
 
In the speech presenting the scheme to Tasmania’s Parliament, the themes of 
compensation as a moral imperative, and of the unfairness of individuals in this class 
being excluded from access to justice by limitation statutes, are evident:35 
  
The Government takes the issue of past abuse of children in State 
care very seriously and through this process is seeking to provide a 
reasonable basis for closure upon what, for them, has been a difficult 
chapter in their lives…A substantial number of the claims that have 
been made to the Ombudsman relate to actions that occurred many 
years ago and, in most cases, some decades ago.  It is likely that in 
most of these cases civil legal action can no longer be taken because 
of the time that has elapsed.  This is one of the reasons that the 
Government has put into place the[se] procedures…The Government 
believes that the victims of past abuse ought to at least receive some 
acknowledgment of their experience and, where appropriate, some 
form of compensation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/ombudsman/CART%20Ombudsman%20Interim%20Report%20070120
04.pdf> at 31 January 2004. 
33 This exists alongside a Tasmanian Anglican Church scheme offering up to $60 000 in compensation 
for claimants, announced in May 2003 by Bishop of Tasmania John Harrower, with an open 
acknowledgment of the consequences of the abuse: ‘Bishop announces further responses to past abuse’, 
23 May 2003, <http://www.anglicantas.org.au/news/mr-20030523.html> at 31 January 2004. 
34 Greens Opposition Justice Spokesperson Nick McKim lodged a Notice of Motion on 26 November 
2003 to establish a Commission of Inquiry into child abuse in institutions in Tasmania. 
35 Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, above n 32. 
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Under the Tasmanian scheme, claims must first be made to the Ombudsman.36  A 
Review team investigates the claim, which includes record-checking and interviews.  
Part of the interview process involves finding out what the claimant wants from the 
process.  Desired outcomes can include an apology; official acknowledgment that the 
abuse occurred; assistance finding lost family members; guided access to their 
Departmental files; professional counselling; payment of medical expenses; 
compensation; and an assurance that children in future State care will not be 
subjected to abuse.  Completed files for each claimant are referred to the 
Department of Health and Human Services for further action if recommended.37  An 
Independent Assessor then assesses claims and decides whether an ex gratia 
payment is made.  The Assessor can determine payments up to $60 000 or more in 
exceptional circumstances.   
 
2.2 Amendments of statutes of limitation 
An easy strategy for governments in this situation to escape civil liability is to deny 
survivors of long past institutional abuse access to courts by pleading the expiry of 
the permitted amount of time in which an individual can bring legal proceedings.  This 
strategy bars plaintiffs from access to the courts to have an opportunity of presenting 
their cases, with the attendant denial of any possibility of receiving an award of 
                                                 
36 See generally the Ombudsman’s Interim Report, above n 32; and the speech presenting the scheme to 
Parliament, above n 32. 
37 By 23 December 2003, 232 claims had been made, involving allegations of abuse at Catholic, 
Anglican and Salvation Army homes, and foster homes.  Sixty-nine per cent of claims involve 
allegations of abuse committed over 30 years ago, with most occurring between 1961 and 1970.  
Thirty-four per cent of allegations involve abuse in foster homes, and 2.4% in adopted homes.  Sixty-
three per cent of the claims concern allegations of abuse inflicted in institutional care.  The claims 
concern sexual abuse (25.5%), physical abuse (39%), and emotional abuse and neglect (35.5%).  Five 
claims involve allegations of abuse occurring since 1991: Ombudsman, Interim Report, above n 32.  
By 2 July 2004, 225 assessments had been completed, with 105 files referred to the Ombudsman for 
transfer to the DHHS: Ombudsman, Child Abuse Review Weekly Statistics,  
<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/ombudsman/Cart%20Weekly%20Stats.pdf> at 9 July 2004. 
The Ombudsman will also prepare a final report for tabling in Parliament, including findings about any 
systemic issues that have emerged, to inform recommended changes to current practice and policy 
necessary to prevent further abuse of children in State care.   
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damages.  As will be seen in Part 4, this is what the Queensland government has 
done.   
 
Yet there is a clear choice to be made.  Expiry of the limitation period is irrelevant 
unless the defendant pleads it.  The statutory time limit does not operate 
automatically to bar a plaintiff’s action.38  Furthermore, the court will not consider the 
expiry of time of its own volition.39  This means that the government has to choose to 
obstruct plaintiffs in these cases. 
 
The Law Commission of Canada made two recommendations in this respect.  First, 
legislatures should amend limitation periods in these cases so that survivors of 
institutional abuse cannot be impeded from bringing civil actions.  Second, 
governments should not rely on limitation periods in these cases to prevent plaintiffs 
proceeding to trial.40  These recommendations are motivated by recognition of the 
ethical, practical and theoretical circumstances precluding plaintiffs in these cases 
from bringing actions within time.41 
 
Governments in other jurisdictions have made choices that illuminate those made to 
date by the Queensland government.  In Canada, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have 
abolished time limits for civil actions based on sexual assault, giving adult survivors 
                                                 
38 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 150(1)(c). 
39 Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 498. 
40 Law Commission of Canada, above n 19, 20. 
41 Cases of child abuse and neglect and their psychological sequelae were little known, much less 
considered, when limitation period rationales were formulated and when limitation statutes were 
written: see further Part 4; and for a discussion of this and an exposition of the circumstances 
preventing plaintiffs proceeding in cases of child sexual abuse, whether institutional or familial or 
otherwise, see Mathews, above n 18.  Some of the reasons why these plaintiffs could not bring civil 
proceedings within time are the following: the individuals’ legal minority at the time of the events; the 
individuals’ lack of literacy, financial resources and understanding of the legal system; in many cases a  
lack of knowledge of the wrong done to them; psychological inability to confront the details of the 
abuse; and the lack of social and legal recognition of sexual abuse and physical abuse occurring within 
institutions at the time (leading to a lack of likelihood of success, and even if success eventuated, a 
likelihood of a low award of damages). 
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of abuse unlimited time in which to institute proceedings.42  In Ontario, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, the abolition of time limits in which to proceed also applies to actions 
for trespass to the person, assault or battery where at the time of the injury the 
person was in a relationship of financial, emotional, physical or other dependency 
with one of the parties who caused the injury.43  In Ireland, amending legislation in 
2000 gave plaintiffs a further year in which to bring civil actions arising out of acts of 
sexual abuse.44  In several American jurisdictions, the effect of limitations statutes on 
survivors of child sexual abuse is being eroded.45  In California, legislative 
amendments in 2002 revived certain classes of expired claims to allow civil 
proceedings against the Roman Catholic Church for sexual abuse allegedly 
committed by priests, and enabled those claims to be launched in the year 2003.46   
 
                                                 
42 See British Columbia’s Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, s3(4)(k)(i); Saskatchewan’s Limitation of 
Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s3(1)(3.1)(a); Ontario’s Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, ss10(1)-(3), 
16; Manitoba’s Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L150, s2.1(2)(a); Newfoundland’s 
Limitations Act, RSNL 1995, c L-16.1, s8(2); Nunavut and the Northwest Territories’ Limitation of 
Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s2.1; see also Nova Scotia’s Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, 
c 258, s2(5)(a) and (b), which although not abolishing the time limit deems time not to run while the 
victim is not reasonably capable of proceeding because of their injuries.  Alberta’s Limitations Act, 
RSA 2000, c L-12 merely suspends the limitation period while the plaintiff is a minor (s5); although 
fraudulent concealment also suspends the running of time until discovery of the fraud.  Canadian 
jurisdictions that have not amended legislation include Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, the 
Yukon and Quebec. 
43 Ontario’s Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s10(1)-(3); Manitoba’s Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 
2002, c L150, s2.1(2)(b)(ii); Saskatchewan’s Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, 
s3(1)(3.1)(b)(ii). 
44 The Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 2000 amended the Statute of Limitations 1957 by 
inserting a new s 48A, which deems certain persons to be under a disability for the purposes of 
bringing civil actions arising out of acts of sexual abuse, and to give them an extension of time of one 
year after the passing of the amending Act in which to proceed.  The Towards Redress And Recovery 
Report noted that its authors were unaware of any such cases being resolved in court, although they did 
know about some cases being settled out of court without public disclosure and without any defendant 
admitting liability: above n 2, 2. 
45 Other states in the United States of America, including New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania and Florida have recently passed measures to extend their limitation statutes, or are 
considering doing so: J Caher, ‘Victims of Clergy Sexual Abuse Seek Bill To Suspend Three-Year 
Statute of Limitations’ (2003) 229 New York Law Journal 1; J Tu, ‘Bills to target clergy sex abuse’, 
Seattle Times, 17 November 2002. 
46 Senate Bill No 1779, Chapter 149, 2002, amending Section 340.1 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure.  The actions revived included actions against persons or entities who owed a duty of care to 
the plaintiff, who knew or had notice of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, and failed to 
take reasonable steps and to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid future acts of unlawful sexual 
conduct.  Plaintiffs in California generally have eight years from attainment of the age of majority to 
institute proceedings, or three years from discovery of the injury, whichever occurs later. 
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Governments in Ireland, Canadian provinces and most recently Tasmania have 
acted to compensate survivors of abuse and in some cases have amended limitation 
statutes to enable those individuals who wish it to gain access to courts.  In both 
moral and legal senses, the weight and scope of the responses in other jurisdictions 
provides a standard of government conduct against which the responses of the 
Queensland government must be measured.  It is therefore of moral and legal 
significance that in comparable circumstances, the Queensland government has not 
taken any such action. 
 
 
3 The Queensland government response 
It is difficult to imagine a response that in moral and practical substance contrasts 
more starkly with these jurisdictions’, than that of the Queensland government. 
 
The Forde Inquiry Recommendation 39 provides:47 
 
That the Queensland Government and responsible religious authorities 
establish principles of compensation in dialogue with victims of 
institutional abuse and strike a balance between individual monetary 
compensation and provision of services. 
 
Recommendation 40 requires the establishment of support services such as 
counselling, and is conceptually and substantially different from Recommendation 
39.48  Recommendation 39 is focussed on developing a method of monetary 
                                                 
47 Forde Inquiry, above n 4, 288. 
48 Ibid.  Recommendation 40 concerns the establishment of a central service that provides ongoing 
counselling for victims and their families, facilitation of educational programs, advice regarding access 
to individual records, specialised counselling for indigenous survivors of abuse, and assistance to 
former child migrants for family reunification.  The government has not fully implemented this 
Recommendation either.  The government’s response to Recommendation 40 was to contribute $1 
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compensation, which would exist alongside the support services established under 
the purview of Recommendation 40. 
 
Despite representations to the contrary,49 there has been no action taken to 
implement Recommendation 39.  The government has claimed that measures taken 
in establishing the Forde Foundation constitute responses to Recommendation 39.  
However, this is not true, since the powers and functions of the Forde Foundation 
clearly do not count in this respect.  Those powers and functions address support 
services, falling within Recommendation 40.  The Forde Foundation is neither 
empowered nor equipped to award monetary compensation.50  
 
The government’s failure to compensate survivors of institutional abuse has been 
made even more reprehensible because the flouting of Recommendation 39 has 
been accompanied by deceptive statements about the availability of civil legal 
remedies.  The government’s 1999 response regarding Recommendation 39 was to 
advise former residents who had suffered abuse to take civil action in the courts 
                                                                                                                                            
million to establish the Forde Foundation, a charitable trust, to provide financial support to enable 
family reunions, counselling and self-improvement expenses.  After the 2001 election, a further $1 
million was added.  This action on Recommendation 40 has not been sufficient.  The Forde 
Implementation Monitoring Committee reported to the government in 2001 that the Forde Foundation 
is insufficiently funded to satisfy the needs of former residents.  So far, about $393 000 has been 
disbursed over four rounds of grants.  The Forde Foundation Trust Fund has suffered from the 
economic downturn of the last few years, has little developmental capacity, struggles to attract external 
funding, and has not been granted the power to adapt its practice.  Major criticisms from former 
residents about the Foundation include the small amount of funds available, the geographical 
centralisation of the scheme and its attendant inaccessibility to all residents concerned, and the trauma 
associated with the application process: see generally Board of Advice of the Forde Foundation, 
Submission to the Senate Community Affairs References Committee Inquiry Into Children In 
Institutional Care, 2004, 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/inst_care/submissions/sub159.doc> at 31 January 
2004. 
49 See for example the government’s misleading claims in its 1999 Response To Recommendations, 
above n 3, 43-44; and its Response To Recommendations Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into Abuse Of 
Children In Queensland Institutions: Progress Report, 2001, < 
http://www.families.qld.gov.au/department/forde/publications/documents/pdf/forde_govtresprogress.pd
f>, 8, 72, at 31 January 2004 (hereafter referred to as 2001 Progress Report).  
50 This is confirmed by the Forde Implementation Monitoring Committee, Report to the Queensland 
Parliament, 2001, 
<http://www.families.qld.gov.au/department/forde/publications/documents/pdf/forde_parliament.pdf>, 
123, at 31 January 2004. 
 18
through existing legal processes.51  This response was repeated in its 2001 Progress 
Report.52  That year, the government recognised that the Forde Monitoring 
Committee was dissatisfied with the government’s inaction and had urged the 
government to consider Canadian compensation schemes with a view to 
implementing a similar scheme.53  The Monitoring Committee found that no adequate 
response to Recommendation 39 had been made, and urged the government and 
religious organisations to do three things: treat the matter of compensation for former 
residents as a serious issue that urgently needs to be addressed; consider the 
compensation models discussed by the Law Commission of Canada as methods for 
use in Queensland; and establish a forum for the processing and resolution of 
compensation claims.54  
 
Despite a clear finding of an omission to act, the exhortation by the Monitoring 
Committee to take action, and even the release in 2002 of a policy by the 
Queensland National-Liberal Opposition directed at remedying the situation,55 the 
government has since continued its failure to compensate victims of State care.  In its 
2001 Progress Report, the government maintained that ‘the appropriate mechanism 
for aggrieved people seeking monetary compensation is the Queensland court 
                                                 
51 1999 Report, above n 3, 43. 
52 2001 Progress Report, above n 49, 8, 72. 
53 Forde Implementation Monitoring Committee, above n 50, 124-131. 
54 Ibid 131; see also Board of Advice of the Forde Foundation, above n 48, 6-9. 
55 In December 2002, Queensland Shadow Minister for Families Stuart Copeland published a policy 
that sought to remedy the failure to implement Recommendations 39 and 40 of the Forde Inquiry: M 
Wenham, ‘Compo plan for abuse victims’, Courier Mail, 3 December 2002.  The policy responded to 
the need to compensate victims of past abuse in State institutions, and in involved a survey to ascertain 
the number of claimants and the amount of compensation required, followed by the establishment of a 
working group which would design an appropriate compensation scheme.  Disappointingly, and for 
unknown reasons, in January 2004, during an election campaign, the Opposition has not only resiled 
from its 2002 position, it has asked that the broad issue of child abuse be erased from the agenda, 
claiming that with the drafting of the Child Protection Legislation Amendment Bill 2004, which will be 
introduced to Parliament on 24 February, there was no difference between the government’s and the 
Queensland National-Liberal Opposition’s policy, and that the issue of reform had bipartisan 
commitment: A Wilson, ‘Child mandate a “red herring” ’, The Australian, 15 January 2004.  The draft 
bill is informed by the CMC Report, and is directed at reforming the child protection system, but 
contains no provision regarding compensation for survivors of abuse suffered either in foster care, or in 
institutional care covered by the Forde Inquiry. 
 19
system.  To establish a separate arrangement for one group of Queenslanders over 
another would be iniquitous.’56  
 
When made, this response compounded the abuse suffered by all individuals in State 
and religious institutions, and it continues to do so.  This response is hypocritical 
since it is exactly this group of people that is treated differently in adverse ways by 
the legal system than other claimants.  Survivors of abuse are effectively ‘under a 
separate arrangement’ because of the unique nature of their cases and injuries.  As 
well as being hypocritical, the response is cruel because it consciously denies access 
to redress to those who deserve it, and because in doing so it causes further 
psychological, emotional and financial distress (the government is aware that Legal 
Aid does not provide assistance in these cases).  Finally, the response is deceptive 
because the government knows that provisions under limitations and personal 
injuries statutes make it both costly and extremely unlikely to gain legal redress.  In 
2001, the position under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 made civil compensation 
virtually impossible for survivors of long past abuse.  Since then, new legislation 
imposing further conditions on the conduct of personal injuries actions have made 
that position more difficult, more protracted, and more costly.  Part 4 gives a synopsis 
of these two situations. 
 
 
4 Compensation through the Queensland court system 
4.1 Pre-2002: the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 
At the times of the Forde Inquiry and the government’s 1999 and 2001 responses to 
Recommendation 39, the personal injuries litigation framework in Queensland 
produced a lengthy, costly and almost certainly negative outcome for plaintiffs in 
cases of long-past sexual abuse in State institutions.  The difficulties presented by 
                                                 
56 2001 Progress Report, above n 49, 8. 
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Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974, which gives plaintiffs in this context 
three years from the attainment of majority in which to institute proceedings,57 have 
been thoroughly documented.58  The key difficulties are first, that for reasons 
documented in worldwide psychological literature, plaintiffs in this class will 
commonly be psychologically unable to institute legal proceedings within time;59 and 
second, these plaintiffs will almost certainly fail to be granted an extension of time in 
which to proceed,60 because of the passage of time and the attendant deemed 
prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, among other reasons.61  These 
difficulties are not remedied in Australian law by the equitable doctrine of fiduciary 
duties.62   
 
These problems are particularly prominent for plaintiffs alleging long past sexual 
abuse, but are arguably no less insuperable for plaintiffs alleging damage caused by 
                                                 
57 Through the operation of ss 11, 29(2)(c) and 5(2). 
58 See Mathews, above n 18; see also L Bunney, ‘Limitation of Actions: Effect on Child Sexual Abuse 
Survivors in Queensland’ (1998) 18 Queensland Lawyer 128; A Marfording, ‘Access to Justice for 
Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse’ (1997) 5 TLJ 221; and see generally A Mullis, ‘Compounding The 
Abuse?  The House Of Lords, Childhood Sexual Abuse And Limitation Periods’, (1997) 5 Medical 
Law Review 22; J Manning, ‘The reasonable sexual abuse victim: “A grotesque invention of the law”?’ 
(2000) 8 TLJ 1; A Beck, ‘Limitation: Time For Change’ (2000) New Zealand Law Journal 109; and A 
Beck, ‘Limitation Of Sexual Abuse Claims’ (1999) New Zealand Law Journal 329. 
59 Mathews, above n 18, 219-221. 
60 Which is available under s 31(2). 
61 See Mathews, above n 18, 223-227; and see Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor 
(1996) 186 CLR 541; Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton 
[2000] QSC 306 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, White J, 8 September 2000); Carter v 
Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335 (Unreported, 
Queensland Court of Appeal, McPherson JA and Muir J; Atkinson J dissenting, 24 August 2001); 
Applications 861 and 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting DCJ, 21 June 2002); 
contrast Woodhead v Elbourne [2001] 1 Qd R 220, and Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court 
of Queensland, Byrne J, 22 April 1993). 
62 In stark contrast to Canada (M (K) v M (H) [1992] 3 SCR 6), the constricted ambit of fiduciary 
relationships in Australia excludes parent/child relationships (Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 160 ALR 
203) and mere acquaintances, so excluding fiduciary claims in the majority of sexual and physical 
abuse cases.  This should not affect the basis for proceeding with a fiduciary claim in this context, since 
the relationship between State and child resident of a State institution is one of guardian and ward, 
which has been recognised as a relationship capable of attracting fiduciary duties: Clay v Clay (2001) 
202 CLR 410, 430; Paramasivam v Flynn).  However, satisfying this definitional status will not help 
plaintiffs in this context, because, again in contrast with the Canadian Supreme Court, Australian courts 
have consistently held that fiduciary principles protect economic interests and not personal interests, 
thereby preventing the possibility of fiduciary claims for physical, sexual and psychological abuse: 
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; Paramasivam v Flynn. 
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long past institutional physical and emotional abuse.63  There are several reasons for 
this.  Just as adult survivors of child sexual abuse typically will avoid stimuli 
connected with the abuse until psychologically able to confront it,64 so too may 
survivors of physical and emotional abuse in this context.65  Just as the long-term 
injuries caused by child sexual abuse, typically Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
depression, take time to manifest and to become known to the survivor of child 
sexual abuse,66 so too will the injuries caused by physical and emotional abuse.67  
Just as adult survivors of child sexual abuse commonly are precluded from 
commencing litigation within the time set by statutory provisions,68 due to the nature 
of the acts inflicted on them - which are frequently accompanied by feelings of guilt 
and shame, and by threats and an imposed sense of responsibility69 - adult survivors 
of physical abuse routinely inflicted on them as children by authority figures in a 
position of trust will commonly not recognise that they have been wronged until long 
after the attainment of majority. 
 
What this means is that the government’s advice that survivors of institutional abuse 
should pursue civil litigation was promoting the institution of legal proceedings by 
citizens who had been physically and psychologically damaged by the State; 
                                                 
63 See the comments made above, n 41. 
64 Evidence demonstrates that in many cases a long period of time elapses before a survivor even feels 
able to report the abuse, let alone to endure the trauma associated with legal proceedings.  In 
Queensland, the report of the Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Child 
Sexual Abuse in Queensland: The Nature and Extent, above n 13, found that of 212 adult survivors, 25 
took 5-9 years to disclose it, 33 took 10-19 years, and 51 took over 20 years: 80 (Table 23).  Where the 
perpetrator is a relative, it is even more likely that the delay will be long.  A Criminal Justice 
Commission analysis of Queensland Police Service data from 1994-1998 found that of 3721 reported 
offences committed by relatives, 25.5% of survivors took 1-5 years to report the acts; 9.7% took 5-10 
years; 18.2% took 10-20 years, and 14.2% took more than 20 years: ibid 82 (Table 25). 
65 See Forde Inquiry, above n 4, 284-287. 
66 See for example Dunne and Legosz, above n 8. 
67 See Forde Inquiry, above n 4, 284-287. 
68 For judicial acknowledgment of this fact, see for example Atkinson J’s judgment in Carter [2001], 
above n 61, 23-24, paras [86] and [88]; Botting DCJ in Applications 861 and 864 (Unreported, District 
Court of Queensland, 21 June 2002) at 36; see also Wilcox J in R v Lane (Unreported, Federal Court, 
19 June 1995), 2. 
69 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: 
The Nature and Extent, above n 13, 47-55, 83-87. 
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proceedings that would cost those citizens time, money, and further emotional and 
psychological trauma, and which were bound to fail.  The example of one of these 
individuals instituting legal proceedings against the State of Queensland, with the 
case reaching the Queensland Court of Appeal, is instructive.70  In Carter, the 
government pleaded the expiry of the limitation period as a defence, and the plaintiff 
was denied a civil trial.71  The plaintiff had been taken into State care when two 
months old and in 1961 she was placed at Neerkol Orphanage, a private institution 
licensed to care for children, run by an order of nuns. Between 1961 and 1972 (aged 
1-12), the applicant suffered personal injuries from numerous incidents of physical 
and emotional cruelty from the nuns.72  She had severe speech impediments and 
was teased cruelly about these, and she endured regular severe physical assault 
including being beaten, burned and near-drownings in the bath.  She endured 
emotional cruelty and torture (eg solitary confinement, and being tied to a pole), 
emotional neglect, and regular forced use of sedative drugs.  From the age of five or 
six, she allegedly suffered numerous incidents of severe sexual assault by a Neerkol 
employee, and from when she was aged seven, she allegedly suffered almost daily 
rape by this employee.  In August 1968, aged eight, she complained to government 
employees of physical and sexual abuse, but she was not believed and instead was 
beaten for complaining.  Aged 15, she fled State care to live on the streets. 
 
When she instituted legal proceedings against the institutions responsible for her 
suffering, this plaintiff received an apology and a legal settlement from the religious 
institutions involved.  These institutions did not plead the expiry of time as a defence.  
In contrast, the Queensland government did not settle the matter, and instead 
                                                 
70 See also Hopkins v State of Queensland [2004] QDC 021 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, 
McGill DCJ, 24 February 2004), where the State pleaded expiry of time to defeat an application for an 
extension of time by a plaintiff alleging sexual abuse suffered while in foster care. 
71 Both in the Supreme Court and the Queensland Court of Appeal: above n 61 (contrast the more fully 
informed judgment of Atkinson J in the appeal). 
72 The Court of Appeal accepted that at least some of the appellant’s complaints of ill-treatment were 
confirmed by ‘ample evidence’: ibid [5] (McPherson JA); [46] and [77] (Atkinson J).  
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successfully pleaded expiry of time as a defence, after its direction to survivors to 
take action against the State in the courts.  This plaintiff, and others, have therefore 
not been able to access civil trials involving the State government.  Any humane 
assessment of the government’s statements in 1999 and 2001, and of its responses 
during litigation, must condemn those statements and responses in the strongest 
possible terms. 
 
4.2 Post-2002: the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 
As if the initial abuse and neglect at the hands of the State was not painful enough, 
and as if the response to the revelation of the abuse by recommending futile, costly 
and traumatic litigation was not cruel enough, there has since 2001 been a further 
deterioration in the situation.  Legislation passed in 2002 added still more difficulties 
for any person in this class of claimant who wants to pursue perpetrators of abuse in 
the courts.  Whether by design or omission, the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 
2002 (Qld) contains no provision about how to proceed if the limitation period under 
the LAA has expired.  An associated problem is that there is no definition of what 
constitutes a reasonable excuse for delay in commencing litigation.  These gaps in 
the legislation create confusion and further costly and time-consuming obstacles that 
must be overcome before a plaintiff can gain access to remedies. 
 
4.2.1 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 
The original Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld)73 commenced on 18 June 
2002, introducing a statutory framework governing all claims for personal injuries 
occurring on or after 18 June 2002.  Most significantly, this framework includes a pre-
court claim, discovery and negotiation process that must be observed by claimants 
                                                 
73 Hereafter referred to as the Act. 
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and respondents.74  The Act’s explicit purpose is to assist the ongoing affordability of 
insurance through appropriate and sustainable awards of damages for personal 
injury.75  Second Reading Speeches and Explanatory Notes explain that the purpose 
of the Act is to reduce the number and size of legal claims, with the accompanying 
effect of decreasing the premiums charged by insurance companies for public liability 
and medical indemnity insurance.76  This object is to be achieved by, among other 
things, providing a procedure for the quick resolution of claims, promoting early 
settlement of claims, ensuring that a person may not start a proceeding in court 
without being prepared for resolution of the claim by settlement or trial, limiting 
awards of damages, and minimising the costs of claims.77 
 
Despite the fundamental legislative principle that legislation should not 
retrospectively adversely affect rights and liberties, or impose obligations,78 soon 
after commencement the Act was amended to make the original Act apply 
retrospectively.  The amended Act, assented to on 29 August 2002, makes the pre-
court procedures apply to all claims for damages for personal injury, including those 
claims where the incident producing the claim occurred before 18 June 2002.79  
Therefore, the Act now applies to all personal injury claims80 regardless of when the 
                                                 
74 Just as significantly in this context, the Act was modelled on the scheme of the Motor Accident 
Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), assuming that claimants have an immediate awareness and appreciation of 
an obvious and recent injury, and are unimpeded psychologically from proceeding. 
75 Section 4(1). 
76 See for example Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 June 2002, 1848-
1850 (R Welford, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice); Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 30 July 2002, 2292 (R Welford, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice); see 
also Personal Injuries Proceedings Bill 2002, Explanatory Notes, 1.  The Act was designed and passed 
in the fraught context within which the Review of the Law of Negligence (the Ipp Report), the 
Commonwealth government’s commissioned principles-based review of the law of negligence, was 
released on 2 October 2002.   
77 Section 2(a)-(f). 
78 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4(3)(g). 
79 As well, s 77E of the amended Act captures claims where the occurrence of injury was before 18 
June 2002, and proceedings had been filed between 1 July and 29 August 2002, a class of cases to 
which the original Act did not apply.  For cases in this category, proceedings are stayed until the pre-
court procedures are complied with.   
80 With the exception of dust-related claims: s 6(3)(b); personal injury as defined under the Motor 
Accident Insurance Act 1994 and in relation to which that Act applies: s 6(2)(a); or injury as defined by 
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incident producing the injury occurred.  It therefore applies to all possible claimants 
covered by the Forde Inquiry.81  This retrospectivity produces many but not all of the 
difficulties in this context. 
 
4.2.2 Pre-court process 
The pre-court process imposes obligations on claimants and respondents with the 
object of providing a mechanism for the speedy settlement of disputes out of court.   
The process begins with the claimant being compelled to provide a respondent with a 
written notice of the claim.82  Part 1 of the notice of claim must be given within nine 
months of the day of the incident giving rise to the injury, or if the symptoms are not 
immediately apparent then within 9 months of the first appearance of the symptoms; 
or within one month after first instructing a solicitor to act on their behalf, whichever is 
earlier.83  If the claimant is a child, a parent or guardian may give the notice,84 but the 
pre-court requirements are suspended until majority.85  Therefore, if the plaintiff is 
proceeding for an incident occurring when they were a child, the notice of claim must 
be lodged within 9 months of their 18th birthday, or within one month of them 
instructing a solicitor, whichever occurs earlier.86   
 
A key provision states that if the notice is not given within time, the obligation to give 
it continues – the pre-court procedures are provisions of substantive law under s7(1) 
- and a reasonable excuse for the delay must be given.87  If a notice of claim is not 
given within time, then the respondent must identify the non-compliance and state 
                                                                                                                                            
the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, to the extent that an entitlement to seek 
damages as defined under that Act fro the injury is regulated by Chapter 5 of that Act: s 6(2)(b). 
81 The Act does not apply only if court proceedings had been commenced before 18 June 2002: s 
6(3)(a), or between 18 and 30 June 2002: s 77A(4); or if a written offer of settlement had been made 
before 1 July 2002: s 77C;  or if other legislation applies to the particular type of injury: s 6(2); or if the 
action relates to personal injury that is a dust-related condition: s 6(3)(b). 
82 Section 9(1). 
83 Section 9(3). 
84 Section 9(4). 
85 Section 19. 
86 Sections 19(1) and (2). 
87 Section 9(5). 
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whether the non-compliance is waived.88  If the non-compliance is not waived, at 
least one month must be given to the claimant to satisfy the respondent that 
compliance has been observed, or to so comply. 
 
A complying notice of claim imposes obligations on the respondent.  The respondent 
must give written acknowledgment that they are a proper respondent to the claim (s 
10); and under s12(2)(a) the respondent must give the claimant written notice stating 
that they are satisfied that the notice of claim is a complying Part 1 notice of claim.  
Further obligations are then placed on the respondent and the claimant to attempt to 
resolve the claim through settlement.89   
 
4.2.3 Problems with notice of claim requirements in this context 
Some of the difficulties for claimants in this context flow from the Act’s retrospective 
operation.  For claimants who suffered injury long before the commencement of the 
Act, it is logically and practically impossible to meet the obligation to submit a notice 
of claim within the time allotted, since the Act and its obligations did not exist both at 
the time of the events and at the claimants’ majority.  For example, a claimant born 
on 1 January 1960, who was abused in an institution between 1967 and 1978, 
cannot have submitted a notice of claim within the time prescribed.  Because the Act 
is retrospective, the claimant’s time period in which they had to submit the notice of 
claim would be nine months from turning 18. This means that their notice of claim 
was due on 1 October 1978.  At that time, the Act did not exist, nor did the notice of 
                                                 
88 Section 12(2)(b).   
89 Section 20.  Division 2 of this chapter of the Act (ss 21-34) compels the parties to provide sufficient 
information to each other to enable an assessment of liability and quantum of damages. If settlement 
has not been reached by this point, s 36 provides for a compulsory conference to take place.  This 
conference can be convened by agreement but should occur within 6 months of the claimant’s notice of 
claim or within 6 months of the respondent notifying the claimant that the respondent was a proper 
respondent under s 10(1).  If the claim is not settled at the conference, then the parties must exchange 
written final offers: s 39.  Section 42 then provides a period of 60 days from the conclusion of the 
compulsory conference within which a proceeding in court should be started. 
 27
claim requirement, and nor did the notice of claim form.  It was impossible for the 
claimant to comply with the statutory requirement.90 
 
By retrospectively imposing statutory obligations that are impossible to satisfy, and 
without making provision exempting claimants in these cases, or at least clarifying 
what claimants in this class should do, the Act has done two things.  First, it has 
added to the legal confusion and procedural legal complexities that plague plaintiffs 
in this class.  Second, it has added to legal costs and judicial proceedings to seek 
clarification of what claimants in this class are required to do.  
 
Claimants in this position who submit a notice of claim can be impeded from 
proceeding.  In responding to the notice of claim, the respondent can argue that the 
notice is noncompliant because it was not given within nine months of the incident, 
and can refuse to waive compliance.  The claimant’s reply that it was logically and 
practically impossible to do so, and therefore there is a reasonable excuse for delay, 
can be rejected.  The claimant could argue that if the period of limitation is deemed to 
have expired, then the Act does not make provision as to how a claimant in this 
situation is to lodge a notice of claim.  A respondent can refuse this claim as well. 
 
As a result, a claimant can be forced to take one or even two further steps before 
even getting to the stage of seeking the court’s discretion under the Limitation of 
Actions Act for an extension of time in which to proceed.  First, claimants can be 
forced to bring originating applications to seek court leave to proceed.  Section 
18(1)(c)(ii) empowers the court to authorise the claimant to proceed with the claim 
despite the non-compliance, and this leave is not contingent on the demonstration of 
                                                 
90 This reasoning also applies to cases of past abuse where court proceedings were instituted between 1 
July 2002 and 29 August 2002, with the proceedings stayed under s 77E of the amended Act. 
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a reasonable excuse for delay, although the reason for delay is relevant.91  Yet even 
if this leave was granted, the need to apply for it causes delay and escalation of 
costs, which is avoidable and contravenes the purposes of the Act.   
 
Second, claimants who are relying on the recent discovery of a material fact of a 
decisive character, where the period of twelve months after the discovery of which 
fact the time in which to proceed is nearing expiry, will have to seek court leave to 
proceed on the basis of an urgent need to proceed.92  If a claimant in this situation is 
successful in gaining this leave to proceed, the proceeding is stayed,93 and the notice 
of claim must be submitted, which takes the claimant back to the beginning of the 
process, therefore creating the need to seek court leave under s 18 to proceed. 
 
The case of Grimes v Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane94 demonstrates some of 
these and associated problems.  The applicant sought leave under s 43 to 
commence proceedings despite non-compliance with the Act, based on an urgent 
need to start a proceeding.  The applicant claimed he had suffered incidents of 
sexual abuse from 1968-1971.  He proposed to claim damages for negligence, 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionable conduct and 
damages under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).95  Because of the lapse of time 
                                                 
91 Gillam v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 566 (Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Jerrard JA 
and Dutney and Philippides JJ, 12 September 2003).  For applicants seeking the court’s indulgence 
under this provision, adequacy of the explanation for delay will be one relevant factor; others include 
the length of the delay, the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant arising from the delay, the 
circumstances creating the claim, and the claimant’s ultimate prospects of success: see for example 
Stanton v DMK Forest Products Pty Ltd [2003] QDC 150 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, 
Wilson DCJ, 14 April 2003); Hodges v Avdyl [2003] QDC 347 (Unreported, District Court of 
Queensland, Boulton DCJ, 14 October 2003); and Arai v Sushi Train (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] QDC 
162 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Forde DCJ, 4 June 2004). 
92 Under s 43. 
93 According to s 43(3). 
94 Grimes v Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 8 
January 2003).  While this case concerns the alleged infliction of abuse in a private school setting, its 
relevance in legal terms apples equally to survivors of past State institutional abuse. 
95 The claims under the Trade Practices Act were correctly deemed unsustainable. 
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between the events and the claims, the claims were barred under the Limitation of 
Actions Act, apart from the claim based on breach of fiduciary duty. 
  
The out-of-time claimant had in the last twelve months discovered a material fact of a 
decisive character which, for the purposes of the LAA, may entitle him to an 
extension of the limitation period, and this twelve month period was about to expire.  
This would constitute an urgent need to commence proceedings since under the 
Limitation of Actions Act, an application to extend time must occur within twelve 
months of the discovery of the material fact.  In this circumstance, the danger is that 
the s 43 application becomes a quasi-s 31 hearing.  Muir J’s comments imply that 
this is what occurs, and subsequent judgments also indicate this.96   
 
Yet on an application under s 43, if the court commences by seeking to determine if 
the client’s material fact is hopeless or otherwise before deciding if there is an urgent 
need to file proceedings, then claimants are put at a considerable disadvantage.  The 
reason why this approach to an application under s 43 is undesirable is that before 
the PIPA, a claimant could file court proceedings without impediment within 12 
months of a material fact, to safeguard the claim.  An application under the Limitation 
of Actions Act for an extension of time, which is an extensive task involving 
considerable expense and resources,97 could then be lodged at any time up to and 
including the trial, with the claimant having the benefit of full investigation and 
disclosure from the respondent.  This investigation and the respondent’s disclosure 
can strengthen the argument for extending time, or can yield even more persuasive 
evidence of a decisive material fact.  By being forced to make submissions on 
limitation issues at the s 43 application, the claimant is denied the benefit of full 
                                                 
96 See for example SG v State of Queensland [2004] QCA 215 (Unreported, Queensland Court of 
Appeal, Williams and Jerrard JJA and Muir J, 10 May 2004) [4] (Williams JA) and [24] (Jerrard JA). 
97 The task is made all that more substantial in cases where the incident occurred many years ago.   
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disclosure from the respondent, and is compelled to advance the extension argument 
without a full and proper investigation. 
 
Among other reasons,98 the respondent argued against the exercise of leave on the 
ground that the applicant had not adduced evidence to demonstrate the possibility of 
obtaining an extension of time under the Limitation of Actions Act.  Although this 
argument was not accepted, the court’s comments suggest that the urgent need was 
not assessed simply by acknowledging the formal facts about expiry of time.  Rather, 
the assessment of urgent need is undertaken by a substantive examination – albeit in 
less than full degree – of the merits of the s 31 application.99  This examination 
aspect does not appear to be incorporated in s 43 and it is submitted that it should be 
the sole province of the court hearing the s 31 application to examine that 
application’s merits.  Although the court did grant leave to start a proceeding, the 
proceedings would be stayed under s 43(3) and the applicant would then be forced to 
observe the notice of claim requirements, introducing the problems noted above and 
the need to apply under s 18 for further court authorisation to proceed. 
 
 
                                                 
98 The respondent argued against the exercise of leave on three bases.  First, there had been no attempt 
to explain the delay in bringing the application; second, there was little material relied on to show the 
possibility of gaining an extension of time under the Limitation of Actions Act; and third, that because 
of the operation of s 77D the application was unnecessary.  His Honour dismissed the lack of 
explanation of delay argument.  The s 77D argument was also dismissed, although without detailed 
analysis.  However, it is submitted that s 77D only extends the time in which a proceeding may be 
commenced for events occurring before 18 June 2002 if the period of limitation under the Limitation of 
Actions Act ends during the period between 18 June 2002 and 18 December 2003: s 77D(1)(a).  Since 
in this case the limitation period under the LAA ended decades before this time, s 77D appears to have 
no application here. 
99 Muir J expressed concern with the ‘vague way in which the applicant’s material treats the basis on 
which an application under s 31 can be made’: Grimes v Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane, above n 94, 
3.  Muir J stated that for the discretion to give leave to proceed under s 43 to be positively exercised, 
the court must be satisfied that there is an urgent need to start the proceeding, and said that ‘There can 
be no urgency and no need if the proceeding does not have the faintest prospects of success’: 4.  Along 
with the testing of the material fact of a decisive character, his Honour seemed to be partly persuaded 
to grant leave because of the presence of a fiduciary claim not limited by time, which, according to the 
transcript, ‘greatly improved’ the applicant’s position: ‘because of that, I think I ought to look less 
stringently at the rather modest attempts to lay the foundation for a claim under section 31’: 4.   
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5 Conclusion 
It is tragic that the existence of the Forde Inquiry and the CMC Inquiry should have 
been necessary.  However, these inquiries should constitute a further advance in 
several senses.  They have the primary function of illuminating events previously 
concealed, of discovering the truth about what happened.  They can acknowledge 
survivors’ testimony and accept the veracity of their accounts.  They can recognise 
the suffering that survivors endured and apologise for it.  They also provide the 
opportunity for redress.  Perhaps most importantly, the findings of these inquiries 
should inform future government action and policy so that these events are not 
repeated. 
 
The Queensland government bears the onus of explaining why it has rejected the 
moral imperative within Recommendation 39 to compensate individuals who were 
assaulted, raped, psychologically abused and neglected while living in its institutions 
and in its care.  It is no answer to say that the events that occurred then were 
acceptable by that time’s standards of conduct, and should not be judged on the 
standards of conduct of 2004.100  The Forde Inquiry, if it needed to, established that 
the acts perpetrated on individuals in State institutions lay far beyond any acceptable 
limits of human conduct.101  It is no answer to say that the State cannot afford to 
compensate survivors of the abuse.  The amount involved would not be impossible; 
other States have afforded it.  If the funds do not exist now – a dubious proposition - 
then the State should find a way to create them.  Moreover, the State is not the only 
responsible source of funding since the religious authorities responsible are also 
morally obliged to contribute to the compensation fund, and should be pressured by 
the State to do so. 
                                                 
100 An allusion to such an argument is made in the reasoning of Muir J in the Queensland Court of 
Appeal when deciding the issues presented by the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 30(1)(b) in 
Carter, above n 61, [36-37]. 
101 Forde Inquiry, above n 4, ii. 
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The government failed to ensure that these citizens were treated appropriately at the 
time they lived in its institutions and in its care.  Now, it has the opportunity and the 
moral obligation to redress the suffering that was inflicted because of former 
negligence.  By failing to do so, it is aggravating the initial abuse.  By directing 
survivors of that abuse to take futile, costly action in the courts, when the government 
was opposing those individuals’ access to the courts, and when the courts were not 
permitting such action to proceed, further psychological and financial damage was 
inflicted on any survivors who took that advice.  Finally, by enacting legislation 
without provision for how individuals in this situation are to proceed, adding new 
passages to the existing legislative and judicial labyrinth, the government has 
compounded the suffering of these people.   
 
Governments elsewhere have acted appropriately in this context.  To date, 
Queensland’s government has not.  The lack of compensation and the legislative 
impediments to courts are the two hallmarks of Queensland’s response.  So far, 
measured against the five principles that the Law Commission of Canada declared 
must be respected in all processes through which survivors of institutional abuse 
seek redress, the Queensland government has failed on all counts.  Survivors of 
institutional abuse do not possess all information necessary to make informed 
choices about what course of redress to undertake.  They do not have access to 
sufficient counselling and support.  Those conducting and managing the process do 
not have the training necessary to enable them to understand the circumstances of 
survivors.  Continual efforts to improve redress programs have not been made.  The 
redress process has caused further harm to survivors. 
 
Apart from policy formation and implementation to decrease the future incidence of 
child abuse and neglect, both within State institutions and beyond them, the first 
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urgent need in this context is the delivery of redress for past wrongs.  For survivors of 
institutional child abuse, this redress can and should be secured through a 
compensation scheme.  On any assessment of the situation, it is difficult to produce a 
morally persuasive reason not to implement such a scheme.  For survivors, it would 
be far better delivered late than never, both in pragmatic and moral terms.  For the 
State, it would not be economically impossible.  The governments of the 1990s and 
2000s in Queensland are not responsible for what happened in Queensland 
institutions before their tenure, but contemporary governments are responsible for 
how they act with public trust and funds when the shortcomings of former 
governments are revealed.  To continue denying the State’s former culpability in 
allowing the damage inflicted on children in its care, and to continue to withhold 
appropriate redress, current governments are inflicting their own damage.    
 
The second urgent need is for legislation that recognises the unique features and 
consequences of child abuse, and which adjusts time-related provisions accordingly, 
to enable access to civil courts for survivors of child abuse.102  This has happened in 
other jurisdictions.  To say that this would benefit both past and future survivors of 
institutional and non-institutional abuse is incorrect; it would merely provide them with 
a more similar chance of gaining access to justice as all other classes of personal 
injury claimant.  This is not a benefit, but the better provision of an entitlement.  
Protection for defendants must not be compromised, but this is easily achievable. 
 
                                                 
102 This includes the victims of abuse in foster care recognised by the 2004 inquiry, above n 5, for 
whom there has been no mention of compensation or legislative change.  The legislation already 
recognises some distinguishing features of sexual assault, which are relevant to cases of child sexual 
abuse: certain provisions of PIPA are explicitly declared not to apply to proceedings concerning 
personal injury if the act causing the injury is unlawful sexual assault or other unlawful sexual 
misconduct.  Section 6(4) states that sections 40(2) and 56 do not apply to these cases.  Section 40(2) 
limits costs in cases where a mandatory final offer of between $30 000 and $50 000 is accepted.  
Section 56 concerns costs in cases involving damages awards under $50 000.  Section 52(2) of the 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) preserves the possibility of exemplary or punitive damages for personal 
injury cases involving this conduct as well, while subsection (1) abolishes that head of damages 
generally. 
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At the least, the Limitation of Actions Act time limit of three years from majority in 
which to institute proceedings should not apply to cases of childhood abuse 
perpetrated by persons on whom the victim was dependent.  The PIPA pre-court 
process aimed at negotiation and speedy settlement of claims should perhaps not be 
made only prospective, but survivors of institutional and non-institutional abuse – 
especially long past survivors - should not be excluded from the civil litigation 
process.  In the PIPA, a definition of ‘reasonable excuse’ for delay in submitting a 
notice of claim should expressly include cases of childhood abuse, hence allowing 
victims of childhood abuse to institute proceedings and comply with the pre-court 
process.103  The government has the responsibility and the power to choose what 
happens for these citizens.  It also has the moral obligation to make a justifiable 
choice.  It should take action now to prevent further suffering in the future.  
 
.   
 
                                                 
103 As well, a number of insensitive questions on the notice of claim form itself, which are not of vital 
importance in child abuse cases, should be stipulated as not applying to cases of childhood abuse.  
According to the Personal Injuries Proceedings Regulation 2002, certain information about the 
incident must be provided by the claimant in Part 1 of the notice of claim: reg 3.  The requirements in 
reg 3 are embodied in the official form which must be submitted: Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 
2002 Form 1 Version 3: Notice of Claim (Non-Health Care Claims).  This form contains a warning that 
s 73 requires that the information given be true, correct and complete.  Among other things, the 
claimant must describe what the injured person was doing (Form 1 Version 3: Notice of Claim, 
Question 11), and must provide information about the availability of a protective device (Question 12).  
The claimant is also required to draw a diagram of the incident (Question 8).  For survivors of child 
abuse, to be compelled to answer such questions is traumatic.  There are enormous qualitative 
differences between a typical personal injury claim and one involving sexual assault.  The 
indiscriminate modelling of the notice of claim form on the motor accident model is inappropriate.  The 
form should be amended to make claimants in child abuse cases exempt from answering questions that 
cause particular distress. 
